










Are optimistic expectations keeping the Chinese happy? 
   
 
 
Paul Frijters, Amy Y.C. Liu and Xin Meng 
 
 




 Are optimistic expectations keeping the
Chinese happy?
Paul Frijters￿ Amy Y.C. Liuy Xin Mengz
November 17, 2008
Abstract
In this paper we study the e⁄ect of optimistic income expectations
on life satisfaction amongst the Chinese population. Using a large
scale household survey conducted in 2002 we ￿nd that the level of op-
timism about the future is particularly strong in the countryside and
amongst rural-to-urban migrants. The importance of these expecta-
tions for life satisfaction is particularly pronounced in the urban areas,
though also highly signi￿cant for the rural area. If expectations were
to reverse from positive to negative, we calculate that this would have
doubled the proportion of unhappy people and reduced proportion of
very happy people by 48%. We perform several robustness checks to
see if the results are driven by variations in precautionary savings or
reverse causality.
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Over the last 20 years, China has experienced signi￿cant economic and social
changes. The degree, sheer size, and the speed of these changes are unprece-
dented in human history. Although the nation￿ s economic changes are closely
followed around the world, China￿ s social changes are less apparent. These
social changes have undoubtedly impacted upon individual day-to-day lives,
including individual feelings and perceptions of the current and future states
of the world. In turn, these same changes pose a signi￿cant impact on social
and political stability.
Many authors have commented on the relationship between economic ex-
pectations, and social and political stability in China during periods of transi-
tion.1 For example, in 1992, Richard Baum alleged that economic growth was
the main reason behind the ability of the Chinese political system to avoid
the collapse of communism experienced in the ex-Soviet regions. Similarly,
Zeng (2003) contends that the legitimacy of the ruling party derives almost
entirely from postive expectations, arguing that only optimistic expectations
prevent emerging social problems like inequality and the uncertainty that
followed the various employment and social welfare reforms. A strong indi-
cation of such perceptions within China comes from the self-identi￿cation of
the regime with economic growth. Chinese leaders have actively promoted
the idea that the political status quo shields economic growth. This pursuit
became clear with the current Chinese President, Hu Jintao, explicitly high-
lighting political stability a key factor for ensuring high economic growth
(AFX News, 2005).2
In this paper, we intend to quantify the role of optimistic economic ex-
pectations in keeping the Chinese happy, amidst all the social and economic
1Examples of this idea from public think-tanks and political scientists include Holbig
(2006), Giessmann (2007), and Zeng (2003).
2Younis et al. (2008), looking at the di⁄erential growth experience across South Asian
countries in the past few decades, indeed also suggest that political stability and economic
growth go hand in hand, though they cannot ascertain the main direction of causality.
1changes.3 The main research questions we pursue are: who has optimistic
economic expectations? To what extent do these optimistic economic expec-
tations make the Chinese happy? And, by how much does life satisfaction
fall, if expectations change from good to bad?
We try to answer these questions using a large-scale household survey
conducted for the year 2002. The survey contains information on both fu-
ture income expectations and happiness, in addition to extensive information
about socioeconomic characteristics and personality traits. We also relate ob-
served expectations to o¢ cial records of the number of labour disputes (at
the provincial level), in order to ascertain whether expectations matter for
observed aggregate behaviour.
The following section reviews the institutional background and relevant
literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 analyses expectations and
their determinants. In Section 5, we investigate how expectations relate to
happiness. Section 6 tests the robustness of our results, given a variety of
possible critiques. Conclusions are provided in Section 7.
2 Background and literature
2.1 The Chinese situation
The economic reforms which begun in 1978 and lead China from a planned
economy to a market economy have generated unprecedented income growth
and dramatic social changes. Since the late 1980s, GDP growth has been
around 10% per year, a historical record in terms of sustained growth. Ac-
companying this extraordinary growth record is an equally noteworthy in-
crease in income inequality. According to the China Statistical Yearbook, the
3Though economists have so far not addressed the question of happiness and social
stability, psychologists and sociologists have reported positive correlations between the
happiness of regions and their levels of social stability (eg. Diener and Suh 2000). Quite
generally, low levels of happiness are related to instability in personal lives and group lives.
2urban-rural income ratio increased from 190% in 1986 to 330% in 2006 (NBS,
various years). Similarly, the Gini coe¢ cient increased from 0.15 in 1988 to
0.32 in 2002 for the cities (Gusstafson, Li, and Sicular, 2008), and from 0.30
in the mid-1980s to 0.45 in the mid-2000s for rural areas (Benjamin, Brandt,
and Giles, 2007).
In addition to the rapid income growth and change in relative income po-
sitions, the urban Chinese have also been subject to two important sources
of social change. The ￿rst being the erosion of the social welfare system.
Urban residents used to enjoy a ￿ cradle to grave￿social welfare system dur-
ing the pre-reform era. Since the mid 1990s, a new system has taken shape
which places signi￿cant emphasis on individual responsibilities. Housing re-
form has led to the removal of subsidized housing, forcing urban households
to purchase and/or rent housing from the market. The health care system
transformed from a full state-covered medical service to an one-third coverage
rate for state employees and null cover for private sector employees. Simi-
larly, full pension coverage has changed to an individual retirement savings
account, covering less than 50 per cent of all employees. In addition, high
tuition fees and compulsory donations are charged at the primary, secondary,
as well as tertiary education levels. The second source of social change for the
urban population is that lifetime employment has been abolished and, as a
result, some 15 million state sector employees were made redundant between
1995 and 1999 (Meng, 2000; MOLSS, 2003; Cai and Meng, 2003; Fan, 2000;
Garnaut, Song, Wang, and Yao, 2001).
For rural people, the most important social changes are generated by large
scale rural-urban migration. In the pre-reform era, individuals born in the
countryside were not permitted to move. There was complete segregation of
rural and urban economies. Rural-urban migration did not take place until
the mid-1980s, although at very restricted levels. Since the early 1990s, how-
ever, large scale migration has accelerated. There are currently somewhere
between 120 and 130 million migrants working in Chinese cities, with an es-
3timated further 150 million to be realised within the course of the next few
decades. Compared to most developed countries, where similar population
movements occurred over a hundred years, China is experiencing the phe-
nomenon on a much larger and faster scale. Although current rural-urban
migration is less restrictive than before, migrants in cities have access only
to jobs which the city dwellers are unwilling to take. In addition, they have
no equal right to access urban social bene￿ts. The unprecedented scale and
pace of the migration movements (with the discriminatory nature) has also
altered the life course for millions of Chinese farmers.
Against this background, our study attempts to ascertain to what de-
gree optimistic economic expectations are keeping individuals happy, hence
devoting stability to the Chinese society in times of transition.
2.2 The theoretical background
Income expectations can a⁄ect current utility in two di⁄erent ways. Ex-
pectations a⁄ect utility indirectly via choices or, alternatively, as a direct
consumption good.
In the standard economic model where expectations a⁄ect utility only via
choices, individuals maximise Ef
PT
t=0 ￿
tU(Xit)g where future utility is dis-
counted by ￿
t, and the consumption bundle, Xit, is dependent on the choices
made before time period t. The choices are made, as such, to maximise
the expected discounted stream of utility where, under the Von Neumann-
Morgenstern assumptions, individual expectations are presumed to be ratio-
nal, hence equal to the mathematical expectation. Note that expectations
themselves have no place in the utility function.
In this framework, where no direct link between expectation and utility is
present, both a positive or a negative correlation between current utility and
expectations may be observed. A positive correlation can arise if the higher
future income expectations are somewhat exogenous to current costly invest-
ments. For example, when arising due to circumstances completely beyond
4individual control (say, the weather or an inheritance). In this situation,
a rational individual would reduce precautionary savings today, increasing
present consumption, and consequently giving rise to a positive correlation
between income expectations and current utility. A negative correlation can
arise under the exact opposite scenario, i.e. when high future expectations
result from costly investments made today. Consider, for instance, a two-
period model where individuals only di⁄er with respect to their time dis-
counting, keeping utility functions, U(Xit), homogenous. Given an increase
in incomes, individuals who care more about the future will save more today,
in order to enjoy higher consumption levels tomorrow. In this case, higher
income expectations today are due to higher sacri￿ces made today for the
sake of higher income in the future, implying a lower utility level today for
individuals with higher income expectations.
This standard theoretical perspective will be important within the Chi-
nese context, and, hence, later in our empirical strategy. After presenting
our main argument for the importants of expectations to China, we explic-
itly examine whether savings and consumption can explain the found positive
correlation. Additionaly, we will seek evidence of a spurious negative relation
between expectations and utility via unobserved variables such as discount
rates.
An alternative theory linking income expectations to utility de￿nes ex-
pectations as consumption goods. Support for this hypothesis derives from
the literature within psychology and neuroscience. Findings point to distinct
neural pathways by which individuals obtain psychic rewards from expecta-
tions of the future (eg. Berns et al. 2006). In its simplest form, this means
the utility function, U(:), is not merely a function of current consumption
(captured by a vector Xit, that includes income), but also contains a large
role for subjective expectations, Eit[Xit+1], of future goods. Hence, here U(:)
is expressed as a function U(Xit;Eit[Xit+1]) rather than the standard U(Xit).
We regard this second possibility as the ￿ true￿e⁄ect of expectations on
5happiness as it relates to direct consumption bene￿ts not captured via other
variables.
2.3 Previous economic literature on expectations
The literature on subjective expectations in macro-economics is vast relative
to that in micro-economics. The majority of the macro-economics stud-
ies deal with the usefulness of subjective expectations in predicting macro-
economic variables such as in￿ ation and growth (see, for example, Mankiw et
al. 2003 and Souteles 2004). The few micro-economics studies on subjective
expectations have so far mainly focussed on whether expectations of income
and happiness conform to the rational expectations hypothesis (Hamermesh,
2004; Das and Van Soest 1999; Stutzer 2004; Hagerty 2003, and Frijters et
al. 2008).
Whilst our paper uses explicit information on the expectations of indi-
viduals about their future income changes, the focus of the paper is on the
importance of these expectations for other outcomes, rather than if expec-
tations in themselves are rational. In a political sense, it does not matter
whether or not these expectations are perfectly rational. However, what re-
mains important is how expectations contribute to economic stability via
e⁄ects on overall happiness.
To date, analysis of the e⁄ect of expectations on individual happiness re-
mains absent from the empirical happiness literature, despite some theories
hypothesising the importance of income expectations for happiness (e.g., the
tunnel e⁄ect hypothesis by Senik (2005); and the theory of erroneous income
expectations (Easterlin, 2001)). To our knowledge, the only available paper
examining the causal e⁄ect of expectations on happiness is a recent study
by Senik (2008) who implements the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Sur-
vey (1994-2004), ￿nding a strong e⁄ect of expectations on life satisfaction.
Senik also ￿nds that expectations improve self-rated health, reinforcing the
notion that there is an actual bene￿t of expectations for current utility. The
6main di⁄erences between our study and that of Senik (2008) are that our
contexts di⁄er and that we have access to many variables which are lacking
in the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey data, including self-reported
relative income position, individual personality traits, mode of the day, and
village/city level characteristics. Our rich data set allows us to better reveal
the causal relationship between expectations and life salisfaction.
One of the main reasons why economists studying happiness avoid the
role of expectations is due to traditional economic theory simply rejecting
the notion of any direct e⁄ects from expectations on utility. Yet, the psychol-
ogy literature has for a long time argued that expectations are consumption
goods and, hence, have observable physical e⁄ects on individual well-being.
For instance, according to Cannon (1914), negative expectations lead to fear.
Fear is physically observable and unpleasant, making it a negative consump-
tion good irrelevant of whether the event occurs. The idea that expectations
themselves have a consumption value is a relatively new concept within eco-
nomics, with only a handful of authors, such as Brunnermeier and Parker
(2004), being notable exceptions. Their work addressed the issue of optimal
savings when expectations of future consumption contain consumption value.
3 Data
We use data from the 2002 China Income Project Survey (CHIPs). The sur-
vey was conducted by the Institute of Economics at the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences (in early 2003) and comprises three sub-samples: urban
households, rural households, and rural-urban migrant households. The rural
survey was implemented in 22 out of the 30 provinces in China, while the
urban survey was conducted in 12 provinces. Questionnaires for the three
sub-samples are largely consistent, however, slight discrepancies are present.
The total rural sample comprises of 9,200 households and 37,969 individuals.
The urban sample includes 6,835 households with 20,548 individuals. And,
7the migrant sample covers 2,000 households with 5,318 individuals. Most of
the questions were asked of all individuals who were living in the household,
with only the subjective questions inquired to one person in each household
(household heads or spouses). Thus, our ￿nal sample includes only individ-
uals of whom the income expectation questions were asked.
The survey questions one individual in each household on how they think




3. A slight improvement
4. A signi￿cant improvement.
In the analysis, we will refer to ￿ 1. A reduction￿as ￿ pessimistic￿ , ￿ 2. No
change￿and ￿ 3. A slight improvement￿as ￿ neutral￿ , and ￿ 4. A signi￿cant
improvement￿as ￿ optimistic￿ .
In addition, individuals are asked to rate their general happiness (life
satisfaction) on a scale ranging from 1 (not happy at all) to 5 (very happy).
Figure 1 presents the distributions of these variables for the various sub-
samples.
For the total sample, around 10.6 and 24.6 per cent of individuals ex-
pect their incomes to ￿ reduce￿or remain ￿ unchanged￿in the next ￿ve years,
respectively; while the remaining 74.8 per cent believe that their income
will ￿ increase￿ . Comparing this proportion to those found in Das and Soest
(1999) for the Netherlands, Chinese households seem to have much higher
income growth expectations. Das and Soest (1999) ￿nd that during a reces-
sion around 11 per cent of individuals believe that their income will increase
in the next 12 months, while during an economic boom this ￿gure increases
to 33 per cent.
8With regard to life satisfaction, slightly more than 10 per cent of the
sample either regard themselves as being ￿ not satis￿ed at all￿or ￿ not very
satis￿ed￿ , 32 per cent are considered to be ￿ fair￿ , while 58 per cent of individ-
uals are either ￿ satis￿ed￿or ￿ very satis￿ed￿ . We compare these ￿nding to ones
from the US, where around 73 per cent of respondents said (in Gallup polls)
that they were ￿ satis￿ed￿or ￿ very satis￿ed￿with their lives. This number be-
ing 84% in 2007.4 Yet, the number of Americans who are dissatis￿ed is in the
10 to 15 per cent of the whole of the 1980-2007 period. The numbers for other
OECD countries fall in a similar range (see Clark et al. 2008), suggesting
that the Chinese are less happier than the average OECD respondent, with
simultaneously there not being a relatively large group who is dissatis￿ed.
Rather, there are fewer satis￿ed Chinese and more in the neutral range.
Figure 1 indicates that urban residents (on average) have the worst in-
come expectations, with migrants second, and rural residents being the most
optimistic. With regard to happiness, though, the pattern is not as clear. On
average, the proportion of individuals who are unhappy is slightly higher for
urban residents, while the proportion that regards themselves as being fairly
happy is highest for migrants. Once again, rural residents are the happiest
group.
Figure 2 presents the relationship of expectations and happiness with
income levels for each of the three sub-samples. Within each group, individ-
uals with higher life satisfaction and high income expectations have higher
income levels. However, if we examine the income levels across groups, this
relationship does not seem to be clear. The happiest rural Chinese have much
lower income levels relative to the least happy urban Chinese. This seems
to suggest that income itself does not matter to a great extent, and that
it is perchance mainly the relative income position which de￿nes whether
individuals are happy. This ￿nding is consistent with the literature (see,
4http://www.gallup.com/poll/103483/Most-Americans-Very-Satis￿ed-Their-Personal-
Lives.aspx
9for example, Clark et al. 2008) and was already analysed quite extensively
for this data by the works of Knight and Gunatilaka (2008) and Song and
Appleby (2008).5
Table 1 gives summary statistics of all the other variables used in the
analyses, disaggregated by sub-sample. On average, urban households have
the highest per capita household income and expenditure, followed by mi-
grants and rural households. A striking aspect is that although the income
level of migrants is only three quarters of that of urban households, their
savings rate is around 3 percentage points higher than both urban and rural
residents. This is a re￿ ection of the temporary nature of their current sta-
tus and a re￿ ection that migration is seen as an investment decision with
inter-temporal costs and bene￿ts. Not surprisingly, hence, migrants have the
lowest level of net assets.
In the rural and urban household surveys, households were asked to report
their incomes in the preceding ￿ve years. This was not asked of the migrants.
Using this information, we are able to calculate changes in household income
for these two sub-samples. The summary statistics show that, in the early
years, the degree of income changes for urban and rural household are quite
similar, while in later years a much higher income growth is observed for
urban households than for their rural counterparts.
4 The determinants of income expectations
In this section, we examine what determines individual income expectations.
The literature on individual level income expectations is quite thin (Das
and Van Soest 1999; and Ramos, 2006). The prime focus in this literature
has been to question whether individual level expectations conform to the
rational expectations hypothesis. Typical ￿ndings report that individuals
5These two papers give extensive additional background information to the Institutions
in China in this period and analyse the income-happiness relation for this sample.
10make predictable but smallish mistakes. This contradicts the relatively large
literature within psychology which argues that observed expectations di⁄er
systematically from outcomes (for a survey, see Rabin 1998).
4.1 Methodology
We model the income expectation, IEi, of individual i as the result of a
transformation of a latent variable measured on a 4-point scale:
IE
￿
i = xi￿ + ￿i
IEi = k , ￿k￿1 ￿ IE
￿
i < ￿k
￿0 = 0;￿4 = +1;￿ijxi ￿ N(0;1);
where x is a vector of observed individual variables, IE￿
it is the latent income
expectation, ￿k - the thresholds increasing in k; and ￿i is a normally dis-
tributed error-term. This assumption makes the model a standard ordered
Probit model. In line with much of the literature on limited dependent vari-
ables, we also run simple OLS models of income expectations of which the
coe¢ cients are more intuitive as they have a direct size interpretation.6 The
results, using both estimation methodologies, are largely consistent. This is
a usual ￿nding in the literature on limited dependent variables, notably for
happiness (see Ferrer et al. 2004). For simplicity of interpretation, only OLS
results are reported in Table 2 and discussed below, with the Ordered Probit
model results reported in Appendix A1.
As regressors, we include a set of variables which are common to all
samples, such as individual and household characteristics, a log per capita
income, and a self-assessed relative income position in the city/village where
the respondents reside. For the urban and rural samples, we then estimate
6Implicitly, when running an OLS on income expectations, we assume that IEi = IE￿
i
and that E[￿ijxi] = 0.
11additional speci￿cations using variables only available for these very samples
(Model 2). The additional speci￿cations being, notably, retrospective annual
income changes and self-assessed ￿good mood￿ , where the inclusion of mood
is meant to overcome the well-known dependence of satisfaction answers on
transient emotions.7
4.2 Interpretations of results
Starting from the total sample (￿rst column of Table 2), we ￿nd that log per
capita income and its squared term are not statistically signi￿cant for income
expectations, while individual self-assessed relative income position in the
city/village has a large positive e⁄ect.8 Individuals who regard themselves
as being positioned at the top-end of the income distribution (within their
home city/village) have higher income expectations than their counterparts
who place themselves at the lower-end of the income distributions. This
is noteworthy as it suggests a time of widening income distributions, with
those already enjoying a positional advantage being better able to take the
opportunities that come along. A change from the lowest to highest income
position increases income expectation scores by 0.47 points.
Another interesting ￿nding is that urban individuals, despite having much
higher incomes (conditional on all the other variables), have much lower in-
come growth expectations relative to their migrant and rural counterparts.
7The question addressing mood di⁄ers slightly between the rural and urban question-
naires. In the former, the question was asked about individuals￿mood on that day, while
the question posed to the latter was framed in terms of ￿recently￿ . Further, the question
on ￿relative economic position￿has a di⁄erent scale for the urban/migrant sample and
the rural sample. In the urban/migrant surveys, answers are on a four point scale (the
lowest 25%, low middle 25%, high middle 25%, and top 25%), while in the rural survey
the answer is a ￿ve point scale (lowest 20%, low middle 20%, middle 20%, high middle
20%, and top 20%). To construct a consistent measure we transformed the di⁄erent scale
into a consistent continuous variable which is bounded between zero and 1 and denotes
the mid-points of the cumulative distribution of the answer categories.
8When log per capita income entered as a linear term into the income expectation
equation, the e⁄ect is positive and statistically signi￿cant at the 10 per cent level.
12At the same time, rural people seem to have the highest income expecta-
tions among the three groups. Such ￿ndings conform with intuition since
individuals with the most ground to make up believe that they stand to gain
most in the near future. Together with the ￿nding on positional e⁄ects, over-
all it would seem that it is the poor who expect to gain the most. On the
other hand, within each group, it is those already best-placed who expect to
perform better.
The e⁄ects of household composition and individual characteristics on in-
come expectations all seem reasonable: individuals from couple only house-
holds have lower income expectations than their counterparts from other
types of households. Additional children and adults increase the income ex-
pectation scores by 0.02 and 0.05, respectively. Males seem to have higher
income expectations than females. Age has a U-shape relationship with in-
come expectations, while Households with higher level of average years of
schooling have more optimistic expectations. Healthy individuals and those
whose spouses are healthy have high expectations, whereas neither own party
membership nor spouse party membership a⁄ect income expectations. Being
unemployed, or having a spouse who is unemployed, lowers income expecta-
tions. A similar result holds for individuals who work longer hours, though
the e⁄ect is minute. Overall, the ￿ndings suggest that individuals with the
greatest amount of human capital and those with the ability to spread e⁄orts
(i.e. members of large households) possess the most optimistic expectations.
Turning to the estimated results of Model 1 for the three separate samples
(columns 2, 4, and 5 of Table 1), we ￿nd large variations in the determinants
of income expectations. Income has a large inverse U-shape relationship with
respect to income expectations for the urban sample, while no statistically
signi￿cant e⁄ects are found for either the migrant or rural sample. These
relationships are presented in Figure 3. The ￿gure illustrates for the urban
sample that the expectation score for the lowest income is around 2.8, in-
creasing to 3.2 when log income is increased (to 8.5), and then declines with
13an increase in income. At the highest income level, the expectation score
actually reduces to below the level for the lowest income group, perhaps in-
dicating that at the very top-end individuals expect to have reached their
peak. For migrants, the relationship is positive, almost linear, in line with
the notion that migrants were, in 2002, only starting to take the opportuni-
ties available to them. There seems to be no e⁄ect of log income on income
expectations for the rural sample.
The negative e⁄ect of weekly hours worked on income expectations is
only found for the migrant sample, which seems plausible given the extreme
number of hours that migrants work on aggregate (71 hours a week, vs. 44
for other urban residents).
The results for Model 2 are reported in columns 3 and 6 for the urban and
rural samples, respectively, with very plausible coe¢ cients for the added vari-
ables: income expectations increase with past income increases and current
mood. Rural households with migrated members have signi￿cantly higher in-
come expectations than households without migrants, re￿ ecting the positive
e⁄ect of migration on rural household income. The other remaining relations
appear to be hardly e⁄ected by the additional variables.
5 The relationship between income expecta-
tions and happiness
Our next question is how income expectations are associated with individual
subjective wellbeing.
5.1 Methodology
We model the happiness level Hi of individual i as the result of a transfor-
mation of a latent variable measured on a 4-point scale:
14H
￿
i = xi￿ +
X
j
(IEi = j)￿j + ui
Hi = k , ￿k￿1 ￿ H
￿
i < ￿k
￿0 = 0;￿5 = +1;uijxi ￿ N(0;1);
with x a set of observed individual variables, H￿
i denoting latent happiness,
￿k the thresholds increasing in k; ui a normally distributed error-term, and
(IEi = j) a set of dummy variables with j = 1;::;4.
We ￿rst estimate a standard microeconometric happiness equation. The
speci￿cation for Model 1 is the same as the expectation function except that
we include the income expectation variable as an explanatory variable in the
happiness equation. In Model 2, we exclude the variable indicating the previ-
ous income change (changes between 1999-2001). We should mention, here,
that the inclusion or exclusion of past income changes makes little di⁄erence
to the e⁄ect of income expectations. The most important coe¢ cients are
reported in Table 3.9
5.2 Interpretations
We ￿rst investigate the relationship between income and happiness. As nor-
mally found in this literature, income brings happiness to individuals. The
relationship, however, di⁄ers among di⁄erent samples. For the urban popula-
tion the relationship is positive and non-linear, whereas for the migrant and
rural samples a linear positive relationship is observed.10 The income gradi-
ent is much higher for the urban sample, while rural people seem to achieve
the same level of happiness with much less income due to their higher base-
line happiness level (see Figure 4). Among the three sample groups, at each
9The full results are available upon request from the authors, and the Ordered Probit
model results are presented in Appendix C.
10When log per capita household income entered as a linear term it is statistically
signi￿cant at the 1 per cent level for both rural and migrant samples.
15particular income level (apart from log per capita income levels below 7),
migrants have the lowest happiness level. Relative to income levels, the asso-
ciation between the relative income position and happiness is much stronger.
The coe¢ cients on the self-assessed relative income position indicate that a
change from the lowest level of relative income position to the average level
(where the relative income score equals 0.5) increases urban, migrant, and
rural individual happiness scores by 0.41, 0.36, and 0.45 points (half of the
observed coe¢ cients), respectively. The equivalent increase in log income
needed to achieve the same increase in happiness would be an increase of 1,
6, and 100 folds for the three samples, respectively. Hence, relative income
dominates absolute income in terms of importance for happiness.
As discussed before, both rural and urban residents are signi￿cantly hap-
pier than the migrants. The di⁄erence being 0.36 and 0.12 scores, respec-
tively. A salient aspect is that rural residents are the poorest group in the
sample, and all of the migrants were once rural residents whose migration
increased their absolute income dramatically. One of explanations for this
paradox is that the migration process leads the migrants to start comparing
themselves to a group richer than themselves, i.e. the urban residents. This
idea is consistent with the fact that it would take a 0.33 increase in perceived
relative position for the migrants to be as happy as the urban residents.11
Of course, relative income is not the only reason for the unhappiness of the
migrants. Other things, such as unfair treatment they receive in cities, the
hard work they perform, and the fact that they are away from their families
should also deplete happiness.
All the other variables seem to be consistent with the literature on the
individual correlates of happiness (eg.Frey and Stutzer 2002). For example,
age has a U-shape relationship with happiness, females on average are happier
than males, and married people are happier than singles. Health brings
11When comparing the answers of the migrant group with the urban group it is found
that on the urban scale, migrants are about 0.2 lower than the other urban residents which
is thus about 2/3 of the happiness di⁄erence between the migrants and the urban residents.
16happiness to people, while unemployment reduces happiness. It is interesting
to ￿nd that party members seem to be happier for the urban sample but not
the other samples. Perhaps the bene￿ts of party membership are higher in
the cities. As expected, mood is positively associated with one￿ s happiness
and this e⁄ect is stronger for the rural sample than for the urban sample.
Further, rural households with member(s) who have migrated are less happier
than their counterparts, despite the fact that the same variable gives them
higher income expectations (see Table 2). This suggests that migration is
probably best viewed as an investment for both the migrating member and
the remaining rural household.
The most important ￿nding for this paper is that income expectations are
positively associated with individual happiness. When treated as a linear
variable, the coe¢ cients range between 0.14 to 0.18. If we simply enter
each response possibility as a separate dummy variable, we ￿nd that relative
to individuals with pessimistic expectations, those who expect their future
income to be unchanged report around 0.13 to 0.38 points higher happiness
levels. If we compare individuals with pessimistic expectations to others
carrying optimistic income expectations, the happiness di⁄erence increases
by 0.38 to 0.64 points for the three samples. This is a 8 to 13 per cent increase
in happiness levels, making expectations even more important than relative
income. Unlike relative income, high expectations are not a zero-sum game.
As a con￿rmatory mind experiment, we can ask how important expecta-
tions are relative to log income. If we compare the coe¢ cients and ask how
much increase in log-income would be equivalent to a change in expectations
from neutral to signi￿cant improvement, we ￿nd the answer is 0.6, 1.65, and
2.7 for the urban, migrant, and rural samples, respectively. This translates
to an income increase of 85%, 420% and 1400% respectively. Even at the
current economic growth rates experienced in China, this is not a realistic
income increase for any individual to expect, even if spread out over a long
period of time. Hence, the e⁄ect of expectations is far greater in terms of the
17e⁄ect on life satisfaction than the possible e⁄ect of higher income could be.
This suggests that the importance of expectations does not run via material
consumption alone. Expectations matter beyond their material component.
Note that, it does not mean that individuals expect their immaterial welfare
to improve. It may simply be the feeling of material progress that gives re-
spondents satisfaction over and beyond actual consumption. A good analogy
of this feeling is the feeling one gets from the prospect of achieving one of
life￿ s main aims, such as having children. It is not only the actual achieve-
ment that gives satisfaction, but also the mere prospect that this is going to
happen.
5.3 Micro-simulations
To further show the importance of income expectations in determining hap-
piness, we perform micro-simulations. First, we use the estimated results
(from Model 1) to predict for each indvidual the (predicted) probability of
being at each happiness level. We compare the results to the actual aver-
age proportion of each sample sitting at each of the happiness levels. The
motivation behind this is to show the general ability of the Ordered Probit
models in predicting the sample proportions. Second, we antcipate individ-
ual happiness levels given pessimistic expectations. Finally, we repeat the
second step, however this time under optimistic expectations. The results
are reported in Table 4.
The results presented in Panel A are actual happiness distributions for
the total sample and for the three separate samples. Panel B reports the
three predicted happiness distributions from our estimated model. Compar-
ing results from the two panels, it is clear that our model mimics the actual
distributions closely, indicating a good ￿t for the Ordered Probit model.
In Panel C, we show the predicted happiness distributions assuming that
everyone had pessimistic income expectations. For the total sample, we ￿nd
that had individuals all expected falling income, their happiness level would
18have decreased signi￿cantly. Comparing results in Panel C with those in
Panel A, we observe that the proportion of individuals documented as being
not happy at all would have increased two fold (from 1.5 per cent to 3.0 per
cent). The proportion reported as being very happy would have fallen from
11.4 per cent to 5.4 per cent (a drop of 48% of the original level). Similar
patterns are observed for all the three separate samples. The most dramatic
changes are observed for the migrant sample: the proportion who would be
very happy would have fallen to only 36 per cent of the actual proportion.
Panel D assigns every individual optimistic income expectations. Here
we observe a signi￿cant increase in happiness. For the total sample, the
extremely unhappy group would have declined to 37 per cent of the actual
observed level. Conversely, the extremely happy group would have increased
by 51 per cent. These e⁄ects are found to be most profound for the ur-
ban sample. Assuming everyone possessed optimistic income expectations
would have reduced the extremely unhappy group to 19 per cent of the ac-
tual level and increased the extremely happy group by 136 per cent. This
re￿ ects mainly the fact that actual expectations of the urban group are the
lowest given the three sub-samples. Hence, a switch to universal optimistic
expectations would have the greatest e⁄ect on this group.
6 Alternative hypotheses
Having made our central argument, we now attempt to dislodge our ￿ndings
by presenting alternative hypotheses.
6.1 Is the e⁄ect of expectations all about consumption
and savings?
Within textbook economic theory, expectations themselves have no direct
causal e⁄ect on utility. Consequently, expectations should have no direct
19e⁄ect on life satisfaction, if life satisfaction is to be interpreted as an empir-
ical proxy for utility. Rather, the e⁄ect of expectations on observed ￿ utility￿
runs via the e⁄ect of expectations on current choices that a⁄ect current con-
sumption. Mainly, positive expectations about future wealth translate them-
selves into a reduced motivation for precautionary savings, thereby increasing
present consumption. If this is true, then, by adding indicators of current
consumption we would expect those with higher expectations to engage less
in savings and for the life satisfaction e⁄ect to disappear.
Our data allows for such predictions from standard theory. In Table 5,
we show, for each of the 3 samples, the savings rates for individuals with
pessimistic, neutral, and optimistic expectations. The information revealed
from Table 5 does not indicate any clear pattern. Nonetheless, the migrant
sample is an exception. Migrants who expected income reductions saved
much more than the rest of the group, clearly demonstrating precautionary
saving behaviour. For the other two groups, there is no prima facie evidence
of precautionary savings and, hence, no clear link between expectations and
current consumption.
Additionally, we re-estimate both the income expectation and life satis-
faction regressions whilst adding indicators of current savings and net assets
to the original list of regressors. In the income expectations regression, the
e⁄ect of saving is only signi￿cant for the migrant sample. This is consistent
with Table 5. When these variables are added to the happiness equation,
the e⁄ect of assets is positive for all the samples (as one would expect). The
e⁄ect of savings on happiness is negative and signi￿cant for the migrant and
rural samples, again complying with intuition: higher savings, conditional on
income, imply lower current consumption.12
Table 6 compares the coe¢ cient of income expectations on happiness from
regressions with and without savings and net assets variables. As evident,
their inclusion hardly changes the found e⁄ects of expectations, implying that
12The full results of the models with saving and net assets variables are in Appendix D.
20the e⁄ect of expectations on consumption is not responsible for the strong
e⁄ect on happiness.
6.2 Is there reverse causality due to personality?
So far, we have implicitly taken the error terms of income expectations and
happiness (￿i and ui) to be orthogonal. Yet, we know that reverse causality
plays a large role in the coe¢ cients of many regressors on life satisfaction (see
Ferrer and Frijters 2004). Unmeasured personality traits, in particular, can
a⁄ect both a regressor and life satisfaction, leading to a spurious correlation
between the two variables. In the context of expectations, optimistic person-
ality traits lead to both high expectations and high life satisfaction, without
there being a causal relation between expectations and life satisfaction per
se.
One reply to such criticism is that our list of current variables already in-
cludes an indicator of current mood which is highly signi￿cant and was solely
included to trace personality traits. Nevertheless, given the low explanatory
power of the model, it is hard to completely dismiss the possibility that the
found e⁄ects of expectations are not due to reverse causality.
As a ￿rst check, on whether personality traits are the missing variables
leading to a spurious correlation between life satisfaction and expectations,
we can include all available personality factors (regressors) that arguably
re￿ ect personality traits. There are no true psychologically recognised per-
sonality factors in our dataset, however there are questions in the urban and
rural surveys which may reveal individual personality traits. For example,
whether people follow the news and feel they are trusted by their boss.13 We
13For the urban survey, we include two indices which are generated using factor analysis
from a group of questions regarding how often people read newspapers, books, and mag-
azines; whether they listen to the radio and whether they follow topics on the economy,
policy and politics. In addition, we include the following questions on individuals￿descrip-
tion of their own personality: 1. I do my best to keep myself ￿t; 2. I always feel happy
when I am at home; 3. In the next 10 years my health will go down the hill; 4. Maybe
my lifestyle is not good, but I could not be bothered to change it; 5. My boss really trust
21include these variables in model 2. The results are reported in the last panel
of Table 6. Including these personality traits increased adjusted R2 for the
urban sample from 0.26 to 0.28, and from 0.30 to 0.31 for the rural sample,
even though most of these personality indicators are statistically signi￿cant
in the happiness equations. The results in Table 6 show that the expectation
variables remain highly signi￿cant and only drop by 9 to 13% for the urban
sample and from 5 to 8% for the rural sample. Hence, to the degree that our
sample is suited for this question, personality traits do not appear to be able
to capture the strong e⁄ect of expectations on happiness.
6.3 Is there reverse causality due to other unobserv-
ables?
A ￿nal check on the issue of reverse causality is to identify random variation.
For this, we need instruments that a⁄ect expectations but do not directly
a⁄ect happiness. Whilst we do not have laboratory-type instruments in our
data, a few candidates seem to be reasonable for the rural sample.
Our main candidate instruments derive from indicators of the ￿nancial
prospects of the villages in which the rural respondents live. These are un-
likely to be related to individual personality or even individual choices. To
this end, the rural survey comprises a village module which was answered
by heads of villages from where the sample was drawn. In that module, the
village heads provide information on village characteristics, income changes,
and ￿nancial situations. We select variables from the village module which
may a⁄ect income expectations of the sample households but should have
me; 6. After a day￿ s work, I feel exhausted; 7. I often work after hours; 8. Many people
come to talk to me about news and current a⁄airs; and 9. I am a very trendy person.
For the rural sample, we include one variable regarding how often the individual helps
his/her neighbours and relatives; two indices about the level of importance of fam-
ily/friends/nice life/health/leisure and work/religion/politics; a dummy regarding whether
the local elections are important to the individual, and one about whether income is im-
portant to the individual.
22no direct e⁄ect on their happiness. These are; per capita village level debt
owed by others and the proportion of the sample households in each village
of which some members migrated.
Per capita village level debt owed by others indicates the village ￿nan-
cial management ability. Villages which are better at ￿nancial management
should be able to recover most of their debt owed by others. This should
a⁄ect a village member￿ s income expectations, while having no direct cur-
rent e⁄ect on their happiness since we control for current income. Similarly,
migrant workers send and/or bring home remittances and generate higher
incomes for the whole village. Thus, the proportion of the sample house-
holds with migrated members, controlling for whether the household itself
has a member migrated, should impact a household￿ s income expectations
but should have no e⁄ect on subjective wellbeing.
An additional instrument derives from the possibility of habit formation
in expectations. If individuals use the past to predict the future (a learn-
ing habit often hypothesised to hold in macro-economics), then these prior
experiences will a⁄ect expectations. Whilst, the most recent income change
experience, current consumption and wealth measures should prevent these
previous experiences from having any direct e⁄ect on life satisfaction. We
use household income changes between 1999 and 2001 (log per capita income
in 2001 minus log per capita income in 1999) to capture past income changes.
6.3.1 Instrumental variable methodology
Instrumental variable estimation in a bivariate Ordered Probit model is not a
standard option in existing software packages. We thus explicitly model the
endogeneity between income expectations and happiness as arising through
the correlation of the error terms:
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Although this model would be weakly identi￿ed from the normality assump-
tion, the main source of identi￿cation of the e⁄ect ￿j comes from the existence
of the instruments Zi: The likelihood function for an individual observation
is:
L(Hi = H;IEj = Jj￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿) =
Z ￿J￿xi￿￿Zi
￿J￿1￿xi￿￿Zi
[￿(￿H ￿ xi￿ ￿ ￿Jj￿i) ￿ ￿(￿H￿1 ￿ xi￿ ￿ ￿Jj￿i)]f(￿i)d￿i
This model was programmed into Gauss, with standard tests implemented
for the internal consistency of the instruments. We present these results in
Table 6. The model includes all the personality traits and saving and net
asset variables.
6.3.2 Interpretations
The results in Table 7 show that past income increases have a signi￿cant
positive impact on individual income expectations. Per capita village debt
owed by others reduces income expectations. The intuition for this is simple:
if a village mismanages their ￿nances and has higher levels of outstanding
debt owed by others, village members may have low income expectations over
and above their own household income earning potentials. As expected, the
proportion of sample households with migrated members also has a strong
positive impact on income expectations. The signi￿cance of each of the three
24instruments is high, a necessary requirement for instruments.
The IV estimate of high expectations versus the default (negative ex-
pectations) is 0.56. It is basically the same as the coe¢ cient of the direct
ordered Probit estimation (which is 0.57). An interesting aspect of our ￿nd-
ings is that the estimated ￿ is very close to zero which suggest no signi￿cant
endogeneity problems. Our preferred interpretation of this is that the omit-
ted traits that would lead to a spurious positive relation (like unobserved
consumption) cancel out the omitted traits that would lead to a spurious
negative relation (such as work e⁄ort).
The test for the internal validity are shown at the bottom of Table 7.
They are based on additional speci￿cations in which the instruments were
allowed to have non-zero coe¢ cients in the happiness equation, interpreting
the increase in the likelihood as a ratio-test of their instrument validity. It
shows that we cannot reject the internal validity of the instruments with a 1%
signi￿cant level though a 5% signi￿cant level means a rejection of the joint
validity of the ￿rst two instruments. The important thing to report here,
though, is that the coe¢ cients on income expectations and ￿ are virtually
identical (no more than 1% di⁄erence) across these auxilliary speci￿cations.
Hence, any choice of two of these 3 instruments as ￿ valid￿begets the same
result on the e⁄ect of expectations on happiness.
6.4 Do expectations matter for behaviour?
As a ￿nal critique to our main analyses we can pose the question whether
expectations truly matter for any observed behaviour, let alone political sta-
bility. Perhaps self-reported expectations are just cheap-talk. In this line,
the relation between expectations and happiness is one between unobserved
subjective traits common to both and not indicative at all of any great sig-
ni￿cance of expectations.
When looking for observed behaviour, we face the unfortunate circum-
stance that hardly any social and political stability measure exists in China
25that would allow us to test directly the e⁄ect of income expectations on sta-
bility. Nevertheless, we are able to ￿nd some provincial level data on urban
annual labour disputes. In Figure 5, we plot our sample average income
expectations at the provincial level (12 data points) for our urban sample
against the log of the number of labour disputes in 2004. The number of ob-
servations is obviously too small to conduct any meaningful analyses. How-
ever, the graph does indicate that the higher the income expectations, the
lower the number of labour dispute cases. Hence, in the one dimension of
political stability, the correlation with expectations is as hypothesised.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we examined the importance of optimistic income expectations
for the happiness levels of the Chinese. We found that optimistic expectations
were amongst the most important explanatory variables, roughly equal in
size to the importance of perceived relative income. We found that the
di⁄erence between optimistic expectations and pessimistic expectations was
worth about 9 to 15% on a happiness scale. The e⁄ect is particularly strong
and important for the rural-to-urban migrants, which is predicted to grow to
around half the total population in the next 20 years. Given that the Chinese
are roughly as happy as a middle-income country like Nigeria or Croatia, a
shift towards negative expectations would bring them to the happiness levels
of relatively poor and unstable countries, such as India or Bangladesh.14 This
means that continued optimistic expectations could indeed well be a large
part of the explanation for the relative stability of China during the immense
transition that this country is going through.
Our treatment of expectations on a proxy of utility is a deviation from
the standard economic assumption, where expectations themselves are not
14Here, we have taken the comparison levels of the mentioned other countries from the
World Value Survey (Veenhoven, 2004).
26considered consumption goods but rather matter indirectly via choices. We
found the e⁄ect of expectations to be very large and robust to the inclusion
of incomes and savings, which are the choices theoretically associated with
income expectations. As Senik (2008) points out, the direct importance
of expectations for utility opens up a whole new set of questions. In this
paper, we have taken the line that expectations are important for keeping
the unhappiness associated with large societal transitions to a minimum. The
role of expectations and expectation manipulation, in normal times, is a ￿eld
still wide open to economists, both experimentally and empirically.
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Income expectations: Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
   Reduction 1,821 10.57 1,260 19.23 177 9.56 384 4.36
   No change 4,235 24.59 2,109 32.18 531 28.67 1,595 18.09
   Slight improvement 10,043 58.31 3,039 46.38 1013 54.70 5,991 67.95
   Significant improvement 1,123 6.52 145 2.21 131 7.07 847 9.61
Life satisfection (happiness)
   Not satisfied (happy) at all 262 1.53 144 2.21 32 1.73 86 0.98
   Not very satisfied (happy) 1,534 8.97 663 10.19 178 9.63 693 7.93
   Fair 5,415 31.67 2045 31.44 827 44.75 2,543 29.09
   Satisfied (happy) 7,940 46.44 3,188 49.01 693 37.5 4,059 46.43
   Very satisfied (happy) 1,945 11.38 465 7.15 118 6.39 1,362 15.58
Mean   Std. Dev. Mean   Std. Dev. Mean   Std. Dev. Mean   Std. Dev.
Per capita income in 2002 8508 5611 6896 6770 2772 2333
Per capita expenditure in 2002 6284 4481 4746 3819 2208 2192
Si t 2002 Saving rate  02 3 0.23 02 7 0.27 02 6 0.26 02 0.28 8 02 3 03 4 0.23 0.34
Net total assets 132401 166754 23625 87313 37330 41301
Income change 2001‐2002 0.10 0.43 0.16 0.35 0.05 0.48
Income change 2000‐2001 0.06 0.36 0.08 0.22 0.04 0.44
Income change 1999‐2000 0.09 0.30 0.08 0.22 0.10 0.35
Income change 1998‐1999 0.06 0.26 0.06 0.29 0.06 0.29
Number of children living in the household 0.57 0.56 0.66 0.73 1.16 0.98
Living in couple only household 0.19 0.31 0.07
Proportion married 0.95 0.91 0.96
Proportion of male household head 0.46 0.62 0.75
Age of the household head 47.08 10.94 35.33 8.96 45.84 10.15
Years of schooling of household head 10.79 3.18 7.92 2.79 7.10 2.56
Years of schooling of spouse 10.23 3.49 7.47 2.75 6.01 2.88
Proportion of household head is party member 0.34 0.03 0.17
Proportion of spouse is party member 0.27 0.02 0.05
Proportion of household head unemployed 0.08 0.01 0.01
Proportion of spouse unemployed 0.08 0.02 0.01
Proportion of household head healthy 0.60 0.90 0.80









Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2
Log per capita income ‐0.064 0.932 0.930 ‐0.296 ‐0.032 ‐0.100
[0.085] [0.329]*** [0.328]*** [0.296] [0.121] [0.122]
(Log per capita income)
2 0.005 ‐0.054 ‐0.054 0.020 0.003 0.006





Income position in the city/village 0.467 0.576 0.536 0.435 0.395 0.366





Couple only households ‐0.039 0.045 0.051 0.042 ‐0.294 ‐0.284
[0.020]** [0.036] [0.036] [0.055] [0.032]*** [0.032]***
No. of children age 0‐18 at home 0.019 ‐0.006 ‐0.009 ‐0.024 0.015 0.010
[0.008]** [0.025] [0.025] [0.036] [0.009]* [0.009]
No. of adults age >18 0.053 0.054 0.056 0.020 0.032 0.027
[0.007]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.043] [0.008]*** [0.008]***
Dummy for married ‐0.111 ‐0.123 ‐0.124 ‐0.211 ‐0.015 ‐0.009
[0.028]*** [0.050]** [0.049]** [0.080]*** [0.038] [0.038]
Own age ‐0.026 ‐0.057 ‐0.055 ‐0.018 0.014 0.013
[0.004]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.013] [0.005]*** [0.005]**
(Own age)
2/10 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.001 ‐0.002 ‐0.002
[0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002] [0.001]*** [0.001]***
HH mean schooling year aged>20 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.005 0.006
[0.002]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.007]** [0.003] [0.003]*
Own gender (male==1) 0.064 0.090 0.086 0.039 0.006 0.008
[0.013]*** [0.022]*** [0.022]*** [0.037] [0.017] [0.017]
Own unemployment ‐0.093 ‐0.044 ‐0.039 ‐0.041 ‐0.090 ‐0.083
[0.033]*** [0.044] [0.044] [0.157] [0.074] [0.073]
Spouse being unemployed ‐0.062 ‐0.060 ‐0.050 0.235 ‐0.021 ‐0.008
[0.029]** [0.037] [0.037] [0.132]* [0.068] [0.067]
Own weekly working hours /10 ‐0.006 ‐0.005 ‐0.006 ‐0.026 0.001 0.002
[0.003]* [0.010] [0.010] [0.009]*** [0.004] [0.004]
Dummy for own healthy 0.093 0.077 0.058 0.222 0.077 0.072
[0.015]*** [0.024]*** [0.024]** [0.064]*** [0.020]*** [0.019]***
Dummy for spouse being healthy 0.054 0.089 0.079 0.017 0.025 0.021
[0.015]*** [0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.057] [0.019] [0.019]
Dummy for own party membership 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.075 0.024 0.024
[0.018] [0.022]* [0.022] [0.094] [0.019] [0.019]
Dummy for spouse party member 0.011 0.043 0.034 0.049 ‐0.022 ‐0.019





Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17033 6489 6474 1841 8703 8579
R‐squared 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.10
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%






Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2
Expectation (=no change) 0.263 0.296 0.278 0.378 0.146 0.131
[0.022]*** [0.027]*** [0.027]*** [0.066]*** [0.044]*** [0.042]***
Expectation (=slight improvement) 0.368 0.388 0.358 0.383 0.303 0.263
[0.021]*** [0.026]*** [0.026]*** [0.063]*** [0.041]*** [0.040]***
Expectation (=sig. improvement) 0.521 0.644 0.610 0.608 0.434 0.375
[0.030]*** [0.067]*** [0.066]*** [0.090]*** [0.049]*** [0.047]***
Log per capita income 0.104 1.348 1.313 0.417 0.105 0.164
[0.092] [0.320]*** [0.319]*** [0.308] [0.147] [0.145]
(Log per capita income)
2 0.002 ‐0.064 ‐0.060 ‐0.016 0.000 ‐0.003
[0.006] [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018] [0.010] [0.009]
Income change (2001‐2002) ‐0.163 ‐0.067
[0.029]*** [0.018]***
Income position in the city/village 0.884 0.836 0.751 0.726 0.913 0.751





Couple only households 0.004 ‐0.023 ‐0.025 0.021 0.079 0.034
[0.021] [0.035] [0.034] [0.057] [0.039]** [0.038]
No. of children age 0‐18 at home 0.004 0.005 0.009 0.072 ‐0.002 0.001
[0.009] [0.024] [0.024] [0.037]* [0.011] [0.010]
No. of adults age >18 g ‐0.003 0.007 0.013 0.007 0.002 0.007
[0.008] [0.018] [0.017] [0.044] [0.010] [0.010]
Dummy for married 0.222 0.223 0.204 0.107 0.213 0.215
[0.030]*** [0.048]*** [0.048]*** [0.083] [0.047]*** [0.045]***
Own age ‐0.017 ‐0.029 ‐0.026 ‐0.006 ‐0.015 ‐0.012
[0.004]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.013] [0.006]** [0.006]*
(Own age)
2/10 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002
[0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002] [0.001]*** [0.001]**
HH mean schooling year aged>20 0.000 ‐0.003 ‐0.005 ‐0.007 0.001 0.000
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004]
Own gender (male==1) ‐0.043 ‐0.051 ‐0.061 0.032 ‐0.049 ‐0.046
[0.014]*** [0.021]** [0.021]*** [0.039] [0.021]** [0.020]**
Own unemployment ‐0.116 ‐0.121 ‐0.121 0.139 ‐0.132 ‐0.057
[0.036]*** [0.043]*** [0.042]*** [0.163] [0.090] [0.086]
Spouse being unemployed ‐0.081 ‐0.052 ‐0.047 ‐0.276 ‐0.116 ‐0.112
[0.032]** [0.036] [0.035] [0.137]** [0.082] [0.079]
Own weekly working hours /10 ‐0.007 0.008 0.010 ‐0.003 ‐0.012 ‐0.012
[0.004]** [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.005]** [0.005]**
Dummy for own healthy 0.150 0.133 0.098 0.025 0.171 0.141
[0.016]*** [0.024]*** [0.024]*** [0.067] [0.024]*** [0.023]***
Dummy for spouse being healthy 0.114 0.102 0.080 0.147 0.125 0.096
[0.016]*** [0.024]*** [0.024]*** [0.059]** [0.023]*** [0.022]***
Dummy for own party membership 0.048 0.071 0.037 0.101 ‐0.031 ‐0.032
[0.015]*** [0.021]** [0.023]*** [0.149] [0.041] [0.022]
Dummy for spouse party member 0.056 0.050 0.063 ‐0.005 0.044 0.028





Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17033 6489 6474 1841 8703 8579




Happy 0 463 0 486 0 373 0 463
Table 4: Actual and predicted happiness distribution with different income expectation
Panel A: Actual Total sample Urban sample Migrant sample Rural sample
Not happy at all 0.015 0.022 0.017 0.010
Not happy 0.090 0.102 0.097 0.079
Fair 0.317 0.314 0.446 0.291
Happy 0.465 0.491 0.376 0.464
Very happy 0.114 0.072 0.064 0.156
Average score 3.570 3.490 3.372 3.677
Panel B: Predicted
Not happy at all 0.014 0.021 0.017 0.009
Not happy 0.090 0.103 0.097 0.079
Fair 0.318 0.318 0.449 0.293
Happy 0 463 . 0.486 0 373 0 463 . .
Very happy 0.115 0.073 0.065 0.156
Panel C: Predicted (assuming all expected income fall)
Not happy at all 0.030 0.038 0.044 0.020
Not happy 0.149 0.159 0.178 0.129
Fair 0.389 0.382 0.513 0.361
Happy 0.377 0.389 0.243 0.404
Very happy 0.054 0.032 0.022 0.088
Panel D: Predicted (assuming all expect income improve significantly)
Not happy at all 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.005
Not happy 0.052 0.037 0.052 0.052
Fair 0.257 0.204 0.372 0.245
Happy 0.513 0.586 0.457 0.489
Very happy 0.172 0.169 0.113 0.210
No. of observations 17033 6489 1814 8703
34Total 6249 21 5015 11 2938 16
Table 5: Saving by income expectations
Urban Sample Migrant Sample Rural Sample
yuan % yuan % yuan %
Reduced 5982 18.13 5370 19.90 2651 ‐5.19
Not change 5563 19.28 4161 8.96 2812 8.30
Improved 6836 23.79 5081 12.03 2850 10.73
Significantly improved 6153 17.44 7445 0.67 3918 ‐4.11
Total 6249 21.12 .12 5015 11.10 .10 2938 8.16 8.
35 assets variables
Rural sample




Model without saving and assets Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2
Expectation (=no change) 0.263 0.296 0.277 0.379 0.146 0.136
[0.022]*** [0.027]*** [0.027]*** [0.066]*** [0.044]*** [0.042]***
Expectation (=slight improvement) 0.368 0.388 0.357 0.384 0.303 0.264
[0.021]*** [0.026]*** [0.026]*** [0.063]*** [0.041]*** [0.040]***
Expectation (=sig. improvement) 0.521 0.644 0.615 0.604 0.434 0.376
[0.030]*** [0.067]*** [0.066]*** [0.090]*** [0.049]*** [0.047]***
Model with saving and assets
Expectation (=no change) Expectation (=no ch 0 263 . 0 297 . 0 278 . 0 372 . 0 149 0 138 . .
[0.022]*** [0.027]*** [0.027]*** [0.066]*** [0.044]*** [0.042]***
Expectation (=slight improvement) 0.369 0.39 0.359 0.377 0.309 0.271
[0.021]*** [0.026]*** [0.026]*** [0.063]*** [0.041]*** [0.040]***
Expectation (=sig. improvement) 0.52 0.637 0.608 0.595 0.439 0.381










































































Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2
Log per capita income ‐0.110 1.247 1.265 ‐0.575 ‐0.130 ‐0.254
[0.139] [0.475]*** [0.477]*** [0.452] [0.224] [0.228]
(Log per capita income)
2 0.009 ‐0.072 ‐0.074 0.039 0.010 0.016





Income position in the city/village 0.765 0.834 0.783 0.676 0.746 0.695





Couple only households ‐0.065 0.069 0.076 0.064 ‐0.489 ‐0.475
[0.032]** [0.052] [0.052] [0.084] [0.059]*** [0.059]***
No. of children age 0‐18 at home 0.029 ‐0.004 ‐0.008 ‐0.034 0.027 0.020
[0.014]** [0.036] [0.036] [0.055] [0.016]* [0.016]
No. of adults age >18 0.090 0.084 0.086 0.035 0.061 0.051
[0.012]*** [0.026]*** [0.026]*** [0.066] [0.015]*** [0.015]***
Dummy for married ‐0.173 ‐0.175 ‐0.180 ‐0.326 ‐0.016 ‐0.006
[0.045]*** [0.072]** [0.072]** [0.124]*** [0.071] [0.072]
Own age ‐0.039 ‐0.081 ‐0.079 ‐0.032 0.021 0.019
[0.006]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.019] [0.010]** [0.010]*
(Own age)
2/10 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.002 ‐0.003 ‐0.003
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002] [0.001]*** [0.001]***
HH mean schooling year aged>20 0.015 0.017 0.018 0.023 0.008 0.010
[0.004]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.011]** [0.006] [0.006]
Own gender (male==1) 0.100 0.131 0.127 0.068 0.008 0.012
[0.021]*** [0.032]*** [0.032]*** [0.058] [0.032] [0.032]
Own unemployment ‐0.138 ‐0.064 ‐0.056 ‐0.100 ‐0.159 ‐0.150
[0.053]*** [0.063] [0.064] [0.241] [0.135] [0.135]
Spouse being unemployed ‐0.086 ‐0.091 ‐0.077 0.351 ‐0.040 ‐0.015
[0.047]* [0.053]* [0.053] [0.205]* [0.125] [0.125]
Own weekly working hours /10 ‐0.010 ‐0.009 ‐0.010 ‐0.039 0.002 0.004
[0.006]* [0.015] [0.015] [0.013]*** [0.007] [0.007]
Dummy for own healthy 0.145 0.112 0.085 0.333 0.138 0.129
[0.024]*** [0.035]*** [0.036]** [0.098]*** [0.036]*** [0.036]***
Dummy for spouse being healthy 0.078 0.126 0.112 0.010 0.046 0.038
[0.024]*** [0.036]*** [0.036]*** [0.088] [0.035] [0.035]
Dummy for own party membership 0.018 0.009 0.050 0.128 ‐0.032 0.051
[0.023] [0.032]* [0.032] [0.224] [0.035] [0.064]
Dummy for spouse party member 0.017 0.062 0.007 0.082 0.050 ‐0.027






Observations 17033 6489 6489 1841 8703 8703
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%






Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2
Expectation (=no change) 0.341 0.391 0.371 0.528 0.195 0.183
[0.031]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.096]*** [0.063]*** [0.063]***
Expectation (=slight improvement) 0.492 0.533 0.497 0.533 0.417 0.380
[0.030]*** [0.039]*** [0.039]*** [0.092]*** [0.059]*** [0.060]***
Expectation (=sig. improvement) 0.744 1.001 0.967 0.876 0.624 0.565
[0.044]*** [0.101]*** [0.102]*** [0.131]*** [0.070]*** [0.071]***
Log per capita income 0.137 1.499 1.492 0.585 0.053 0.135
[0.133] [0.472]*** [0.479]*** [0.448] [0.214] [0.221]
(Log per capita income)
2 0.003 ‐0.068 ‐0.065 ‐0.022 0.006 0.003
[0.008] [0.027]** [0.027]** [0.026] [0.014] [0.014]
Income change (2001‐2002) ‐0.230 ‐0.100
[0.043]*** [0.028]***
Income position in the city/village 1.254 1.234 1.131 1.059 1.286 1.102





Couple only households 0.006 ‐0.022 ‐0.026 0.031 0.108 0.045
[0.031] [0.051] [0.052] [0.083] [0.056]* [0.057]
No. of children age 0‐18 at home 0.007 0.014 0.018 0.106 ‐0.001 0.004
[0.013] [0.036] [0.036] [0.054]** [0.015] [0.016]
No. of adults age >18 ‐0.007 0.010 0.020 0.009 0.002 0.009
[0 011] .011] [0 026] . 6] [0 026] . 6] [0 064] .064] [0 014] .014] [0 014] .014]
Dummy for married 0.293 0.297 0.274 0.160 0.270 0.287
[0.044]*** [0.071]*** [0.071]*** [0.121] [0.067]*** [0.068]***
Own age ‐0.024 ‐0.043 ‐0.039 ‐0.010 ‐0.021 ‐0.017
[0.006]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.019] [0.009]** [0.009]*
(Own age)
2/10 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.003
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002] [0.001]*** [0.001]**
HH mean schooling year aged>20 ‐0.001 ‐0.005 ‐0.007 ‐0.011 0.002 0.000
[0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010] [0.006] [0.006]
Own gender (male==1) ‐0.064 ‐0.075 ‐0.092 0.047 ‐0.075 ‐0.076
[0.020]*** [0.031]** [0.032]*** [0.056] [0.030]** [0.030]**
Own unemployment ‐0.148 ‐0.155 ‐0.157 0.211 ‐0.205 ‐0.103
[0.051]*** [0.062]** [0.063]** [0.236] [0.129] [0.130]
Spouse being unemployed ‐0.105 ‐0.065 ‐0.060 ‐0.406 ‐0.179 ‐0.182
[0.045]** [0.052] [0.052] [0.199]** [0.118] [0.119]
Own weekly working hours /10 ‐0.010 0.013 0.015 ‐0.006 ‐0.017 ‐0.017
[0.005]* [0.014] [0.015] [0.013] [0.007]** [0.007]**
Dummy for own healthy 0.213 0.197 0.146 0.036 0.239 0.206
[0.023]*** [0.035]*** [0.035]*** [0.097] [0.034]*** [0.035]***
Dummy for spouse being healthy 0.165 0.154 0.122 0.219 0.180 0.147
[0.023]*** [0.036]*** [0.036]*** [0.086]** [0.033]*** [0.034]***
Dummy for own party membership 0.072 0.075 0.057 ‐0.015 0.070 ‐0.046
[0.022]*** [0.031]** [0.035]*** [0.141] [0.060] [0.034]
Dummy for spouse party member 0.080 0.112 0.102 0.159 ‐0.043 0.049





Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17033 6489 6474 1841 8703 8579
dd bk Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
43